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Impact of Land Reform on Productivity, Land Value and Human Capital Investment: 




While land reform has been the subject of considerable scholarly debate, most of 
the analyses have been at the aggregate level and focused on rather short-term 
effects. We use a listing of more than 90,000 households in some 200 villages in 
West Bengal to highlight the impact of the state’s 1978 land reform program on 
human capital accumulation and current productivity of land use. While we 
ascertain a highly significant positive effect on long-term accumulation of human 
capital, our analysis also suggests that, partly because land that had been received 
through land reform is still operated under share tenancy arrangements, 
productivity on such land is significantly lower than the average. The 
combination of lower productivity of reform land relative to own land and land 
rental and sale’s restriction of reform land is associated with significantly lower 
purchase and sale’s price of reform land compared to own land. Programs to 
allow land reform beneficiaries to acquire full ownership could thus have 
significant benefits.  
 
1. Introduction  
Land holdings in India were historically distributed in a highly unequal fashion, and have 
always been used as a source of social power. Ensuring secure access to land for the poor and 
landless had been the key motivation for India's land reform since independence. Since then a 
number of land reforms have been carried out by the government – abolition of ‘Zamindari’ or 
middlemen as revenue collectors, imposing ceiling on landholdings and awarding of the surplus 
land’s rights to landless, and tenancy reforms (Mearns, 1998). While abolition of intermediaries 
has been implemented swiftly and successfully without much obstacle, the implementation of 
ceiling and tenancy reforms are vehemently challenged.   
Land reforms have impacted 12.4 mn tenants on 15.6 mn acres of land, through 
redistribution of ownership rights or by providing them secure access, as per the Government of 
India records until 2002 (Hanstad et al., 2008). Total area affected in India is more than three 
times what was involved in the well-known land reforms of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan together 
(King 1977).   However, the implementation of the land reform in India has varied vastly across 3 
 
states.  The two states that have been most successful in implementing tenancy and ceiling 
reforms are West Bengal and Kerala (Ghatak and Roy, 2007).  In West Bengal this was achieved 
by the launch of a tenant registration drive in 1978, popularly known as “Operation Barga”. This 
was a program designed to implement tenancy laws that regulated rent and provided security of 
tenure to sharecroppers. Due to subsequent successful implementation of the tenancy laws in 
West Bengal, we look at the evidence of impact of reforms in this state.  
Despite considerable interest in the topic at the policy level and a large literature 
documenting the way land reforms were put in practice at the state level (Yugandhar 1996, 
Thangaraj 2004), quantitative evidence on their impact is limited. Up to now all of the evidence 
on land reform impacts has been at a highly aggregate level (state or district level) and failed to 
distinguish the types of reform with varying outcomes. The high aggregation clearly limits the 
policy relevance of these studies.   
Besley and Burgess (2000) using all-India data exploit interstate variations and find that 
the number of identifiable land reform laws across states is positively related to the extent of 
poverty reduction but not agricultural productivity.  Using the same data Ghatak and Roy (2007) 
find that the impact of land reform on agricultural productivity depends on the type of reform. 
They also check the robustness of results by using additional measures of productivity from 
alternate datasets.  Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (2002) use district level data from West Bengal 
to conclude reforms improved productivity, and can explain 28 percent of the agricultural 
productivity growth occurring post reforms. Similarly, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2007) use a 
village level land reform data to conclude a positive impact on productivity. Reforms also affect 
the accumulation of human and physical capital of the beneficiary households (Deininger et al. 
2008).  Given the evidence that poor and landless are likely to benefit most from land reform 
(Besley and Burgess 2001; Deininger et al. 2008), role of tenancy reforms in enhancing human 
capital investment of children of bargadars household is an important long-term impact of these 
reform.  4 
 
The policy relevance of study the impact of land reform at individual beneficiary level 
has well emphasized in the literature (Ghatak and Roy, 2007; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2007).  
Data limitation is probably the single most important reason why almost all the studies on this 
topic are based on aggregate data.  In this paper, we use a large sample of households from West 
Bengal, one of the Indian state where land reform implementation, through the award of 
permanent tenancy rights to barga land following the ascent to power of the Communist Party in 
1978, has made the greatest advances. To contribute to the policy debate, we assess benefits and 
potential cost of such reform. Evidence of long-term benefits is obtained from exploring changes 
in educational advancement of beneficiaries’ off-spring as well as beneficiaries’ asset ownership 
compared to that of non-beneficiaries. While our data preclude inferences on the cost of 
implementation, it is likely that beneficiaries’ continued need to pay rent to landlords causes 
considerable inefficiency. To test this, we test whether productivity of land use is affected by the 
share of land held under barga. Both of these together suggest that land reform did lead to long-
term benefits but that at this point, ways of awarding full ownership to beneficiaries could be 
efficiency-enhancing.  
The main objective of this study is to assess the potential benefit and cost of land reform 
that has been implemented a few decades ago.  We use a listing of more than 90,000 households 
in some 200 villages in West Bengal to highlight the impact of the state’s 1978 land reform 
program on human capital accumulation and current productivity of land use. We assess the long-
term impact of land reform on educational attainments of household members in the reform 
beneficiary households. In addition, we assess and quantify potential inefficiency in crop 
cultivation associated with tenancy. This is achieved by regressing total gross revenue (before 
rent payment) of a household on the share of land reform land cultivated. Hedonic regressions of 
market prices for land are used to provide additional evidence to corroborate results on the net 
effect of productivity of land use and market restrictions associated with tenancy and ceiling 
reform land.  5 
 
We find land reform significantly increased the education attainment for the members of 
beneficiary households. While we ascertain a highly significant positive effect on long-term 
accumulation of human capital, our analysis also suggests that, partly because land that had been 
received through land reform is still operated under share tenancy arrangements, productivity on 
such land is significantly lower than the average (by 21-35%).   This is consistent with land price 
regressions which point to market price for owned land being 8-14% higher than that for land 
reform land after all other factors (including plot characteristics and village dummies) are 
controlled for.  Programs to allow land reform beneficiaries to acquire full ownership could thus 
have significant benefits.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section two discusses land reform in a global context and 
posits the hypotheses to be tested. Section three describes data sources and discusses descriptive 
statistics. The econometric results are presented in section four and section five concludes by 
briefly discussing policy implications. 
2. Background and relation to the literature  
This section reviews the rationale and level of land reform implementation -globally and in India- 
highlighting main types of land reform and the quantitative accomplishments under each of them. 
We use this as a basis to formulate hypotheses on the impact of different types of land reform and 
their evolution over time and to outline our strategy that will allow us to assess these empirically 
using the data at hand.  
2.1 Land reform in a global context 
A large body of empirical literature on agricultural production has shown that, due to the 
transaction costs involved in supervising hired labor (Carter 1984, Feder 1985, Eswaran and 
Kotwal 1985, Benjamin 1995), a farm structure based on owner-operated units is more efficient 
than one based on wage labor (Berry and Cline 1979, Binswanger et al. 1995). Although market 
mechanisms can, in principle, help to equalize the operational land distribution and thus 6 
 
maximize aggregate production, challenges remain. First, transaction costs and borrowing 
constraints may reduce the number of market transactions well below the optimum. Second, to 
the extent that transactions in rental and sales markets require transfers of resources among the 
parties involved even productivity-enhancing transactions may have undesirable distributional 
implications. At low levels of development, and especially with high inequality in the land 
ownership distribution, landlords may be able to reduce the benefits to tenants by exerting market 
power. At higher levels of development, speculative elements may cause a discrepancy between 
the market value of land and its underlying ‘fundamental’ value based on profits from agricultural 
production, thereby preventing movement of land to the most productive producers. Third, with 
imperfections in other markets, e.g. those for labor or credit, market transactions may not achieve 
first best outcomes in terms of production. As a result, government interventions that aim to 
provide the most productive producers with land access can have significant social and economic 
benefits (Chau 1998, Carter and Zimmerman 2000).  
In addition to its potential to increase productivity, land reform can, through its possible effect on 
credit markets, also affect productive investment. It can have additional impacts by overcoming 
some of the negative consequences of a highly unequal distribution of asset ownership and 
economic opportunities. One frequently cited issue is that, with credit market imperfections, the 
poor may not be able to attain the level of indivisible investment in human or physical capital that 
would correspond to their innate ability (Galor and Zeira 1993, Gersbach and Siemers 2005). In 
such situations, exogenous increases of asset endowments can bring the level of investment closer 
to the social optimum and also be beneficial to the individuals concerned. A second possible 
reason is that limited access to economic resources is likely to translate into limited political 
influence, possibly giving rise to a vicious and self-perpetuating circle of high inequality, bad 
institutions, and low economic growth (Acemoglu et al. 2004). Also, a tendency towards 
segregation may affect communities’ ability to supply local public goods and, to the extent that 7 
 
these are essential inputs into private production, trap the poor in an undesirable equilibrium 
(Durlauf 1996, Cardenas 2003). This can be pronounced in cases where what is produced are 
public “bads” such as violence, social unrest, and strife, which are associated with significant 
economic as well as social costs.
1  
The potential productivity and social benefits from a more egalitarian distribution of land, often 
combined with arguments in favor of historical justice, have provided a justification for 
redistributive policies in many countries. The goal was to establish a foundation for an inclusive 
and broad-based pattern of economic development in some of the world’s most unequal societies. 
The review of land reform episodes in table 1 illustrates that the magnitude of such efforts, in 
terms of the number of beneficiaries and the size of area redistributed, was enormous.
2 Well-
known land reforms in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan at the end of World War II redistributed 
between 30% and 40% of the cultivated area, affecting about two thirds of rural households. 
Although they were drawn out over longer time periods, reforms in Bolivia, Nicaragua, Peru, and 
Mexico, affected sizeable portions of their countries’ arable land endowment and benefited up to 
a third of the rural population.  
Compared to the magnitude of these efforts, evidence on their effect is scant and often focused on 
outputs rather than impact based on a rigorous counterfactual. In Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, land 
reforms helped improve productivity and set the stage for an impressive increase in non-
agricultural development (Jeon and Kim 2000). In the Philippines, early land reforms that 
benefited more than 0.5 million households and green revolution technology, improved 
household welfare (Otsuka 1991, Balisacan and Fuwa 2004) and increased investment and human 
capital accumulation (Deininger and Olinto 2001). Although quite effective, land reforms 
                                                 
1 For a theoretical underpinning for the relationship between distribution and provision of public goods, including social cohesion, see 
(Bardhan and Ghatak 1999). It has also been shown that, especially in rural environments where other markets are imperfect, such 
interventions can help improve their nutritional status, risk-bearing capacity, and investment incentives, in addition to enhancing their 
ability to access credit markets (Burgess 2001).  
2 The purpose of this table is illustrative, to provide an indication of the orders of magnitude involved. Figures on area redistributed 
and number of beneficiary households are taken from the cited sources and percentages have been calculated by taking the total area 
of arable land (from FAO statistics) and the rural population divided by 5 (to obtain an estimate of the number of rural households).  8 
 
undertaken immediately after independence in some African countries, e.g. Kenya  and 
Zimbabwe (Scott 1976, Gunning and et al 2000, Deininger et al. 2004) were often abandoned for 
political reasons (Kinsey and Binswanger 1993). In Latin America, reforms distributed 
comparatively large amounts of land (Barraclough 1970, Eckstein and Horton 1978, Jarvis 1989) 
but often failed to improve productivity and were insufficient to help overcome deep-rooted 
structural inequalities (de Janvry and Sadoulet 1989). Following a relative decline of interest in 
the topic during the late 1970s, it received renewed attention recently,
3 partly due to the fact that, 
even if accompanied by high levels of growth, macro-economic reforms in countries 
characterized by high land inequality often failed to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor. 
More importantly, the task which the original reforms set out to accomplish remains in many 
respects unfinished (Lipton 1993). Together with a strong political appeal of land redistribution, 
this has recently prompted countries as diverse as Brazil, Bolivia, South Africa, the Philippines, 
Venezuela, and Zimbabwe to renew their land reform efforts.  
2.2 Land reform implementation in India  
In India, land reform, implementation of which is the responsibility of individual states, has 
occupied a central stage in the policy debate for long time, given inequality in the distribution of 
productive assets, especially land, which the country inherited from its colonial masters. Reforms 
had three main elements (Mearns 1999), namely (i) abolition of intermediaries (zamindars) 
shortly after independence; (ii) tenancy laws to increase tenure security by sitting tenants by 
registering them and often imposing restrictions on the amount of rent they had to pay or the 
scope for new rental transactions;
4 (iii) ceiling laws that provided a basis for expropriating land 
held by any given owner in excess of a state-specific ceiling and subsequently transferring it to 
poor farmers or landless agricultural workers. While the first of these is considered to have been 
                                                 
3 For recent contributions on land reform see (Boyce et al. 1998, Bandiera 2003, Bobrow-Strain 2004, Borras, Jr. 2005, Bradstock 
2005, Eastwood et al. 2006).  
4 Many states combined legislation to improve the situation of tenants with either a complete prohibition of land leasing or provisions 
to provide tenants who had been on the land for some time with very strong property rights, something that is likely to have limited 
new supply of land to the rental market (Deininger et al. 2007). 
 9 
 
highly successful, progress on the remainder was initially very slow, accelerating only during the 
1970s and slowing down again in the 1980s. Still, both types of intervention resulted in the 
transfer of rights to almost 10 mn hectares of land, an area more than three times what was 
involved in the well-known land reforms of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan together (King 1977). 
With the exception of few states, the political commitment to implement reforms was limited and 
sometimes outcomes were counter to what had been desired, as with large-scale tenant evictions 
to prevent them from gaining more permanent land rights in anticipation of tenancy laws (Appu 
1997). 
Table 2 provide summary statistics for the level of land reform implementation, measured as the 
share of rural population who received land through tenancy reform, the area transferred as a 
result of ceiling legislation, or the number of ceiling laws, by state based on a summary report 
that draws together official data from various annual reports by the Ministry of Agriculture 
(Kaushik 2005). Over and above the large amounts of land affected by zamindari abolition and 
private initiatives such as donations of land under the Bhoodan movement,
5  direct  land 
distribution affected about 2.5 mn hectares under programs to redistribute of ceiling surplus land, 
and 7.35 mn hectares under tenancy reform, implying a direct transfer of 5.45% of the area to 
about 5.35% of the agricultural population for the country as a whole. Comparing this to what has 
been involved in other land reforms internationally illustrates the size of India’s land reform.
6 
Ceiling and tenancy laws together resulted in the redistribution of about 10% of arable land, about 
the level of the Philippines, Brazil, or Zimbabwe before 2000, but below Asian countries such as 
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (33.3%, 27.3%, and 26.9%) or even El Salvador, Bolivia, and Mexico 
(27.9%, 32.3%, and 13.5%). In terms of the share of rural households benefiting, India’s 
accomplishment is at the lower end of the scale; while it exceeds what has been accomplished in 
                                                 
5 The amount of land donated voluntarily and distributed under the Bhoodan movement amounted to 0,7 mn ha by 2004, with focus on 
Bihar, Orissa, and Uttar Pradesh(Government of India 2006a). While some of these donations may have been motivated by a desire to 
avoid being affected by ceiling laws, we subsume all of these under the indirect effects of legal measures.  
6 Note that the two measures considered here, i.e. tenancy reform and distribution of above-ceiling land, are in addition to any lands 
transferred through zamindari abolition.  10 
 
the pre-1994 period in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Brazil (1.6%, 3.1%, and 5.4% of the rural 
population, respectively), it remains considerably below other Asian countries such as the 
Philippines (24%), Japan (60.9%), and Taiwan (62.5%) or Latin American ones such as Mexico 
(67.5%), Bolivia (47.5%), and El Salvador (16.8%).  
Comparing the share of beneficiary households to that of the area transferred points towards 
considerable variation across states. In some cases, e.g. Kerala or West Bengal, 12.5% and 10.8% 
of the population benefited from transfer of 8.5% and 6.4% of the land area, respectively, plot 
sizes for land transferred remained considerable below the state average. While some states (e.g. 
Gujarat or Tamil Nadu) provided beneficiaries with plots of about average size, in most of the 
states the fact that the share of beneficiaries remains significantly below the area share points 
towards transfer of above-average plot sizes, as in Maharashtra (27% of area distributed to 10.7% 
of population), Karnataka (15.4% and 5.3%), AP and MP (3.5% and 2.2% to 0.75% and 0.61% of 
population, respectively).  
With 4.4% and 2.3%, the share of area redistributed overall or share of households benefiting 
from ceiling laws has been below the figures for tenancy reform. Although some states such as 
Rajasthan, UP, Bihar, and AP transferred more land (6.6%, 5.8%, 4.4%, and 8.3%) under ceiling 
legislation than through tenancy reform, results seem to have been biased towards transfer of 
above-average sized plots of land, suggesting that even where it was possible to acquire above 
ceiling land by the state, overcoming political pressures in the distribution of such land may have 
been difficult. In West Bengal, on the other hand, a state that ranks at or near the top for both 
measures and that counts with a formidable level of grassroots-level organization, land reform 
land appears to have been transferred in a very pro-poor fashion.  
For the country as a whole, an average of 2.1 land reform laws had been passed per state with the 
mean law being about 13 years old in 1999. Despite the fact that the highest number of laws was 
passed in West Bengal where reform-induced transfers were also highest, the correlation between 11 
 
number of laws and the share of area transferred through or of rural households benefiting from 
reform is, with 0.28, low throughout. This supports the notion that legal provisions alone did not 
automatically translate into action on the ground, consistent with arguments that there is no a-
priori reason to expect a positive link between passage of laws -which could be a result of an 
objective need for land reform and political mobilization or even lack of actual progress- and 
their actual implementation. In fact, in a number of states, high levels of legal activity appear to 
have been used to deflect attention from lack of progress on the ground. 
While not differentiated in the table, a detailed look at the time dimension of reform measures 
allows a number of conclusions (Kaushik 2005): After a spurt of land transfers in the 1970s and 
1980s, progress has slowed down considerably; in fact between 1995/96 and 2003/04, i.e. for 
almost a decade, progress in awarding land rights to tenants had come to a complete standstill; the 
increment in ceiling surplus land transferred during the period amounted to only 10,800 hectares. 
The latter represents about one tenth of the land declared ceiling surplus, with the remainder 
being tied up in litigation. This suggests that, unless there are significant changes in the overall 
parameters, progress in achieving further redistribution of ceiling land could be slow -it would 
take almost 90 years to dispose of remaining ceiling surplus cases if the current pace is 
maintained- but also that, by clogging up the court system and preventing it from quickly 
dispensing justice in other urgent matters, the ceiling legislation may impose external effects 
beyond land rental markets (Moog 1997).
7  While broader changes in the legal framework could 
make much additional land available, they do not seem to be too likely in the current political 
environment.  
Despite considerable interest in the topic at the policy level and a large literature documenting the 
way land reforms were put in practice at the state level (Yugandhar 1996, Thangaraj 2004), 
                                                 
7 Two main reasons for court cases are contestation by landlords and instances where beneficiaries were allocated land but were either 
unable to establish effective possession or were subsequently evicted. A field survey to explore this issue in Andhra Pradesh pointed 
to at least 20% of beneficiaries who were not able to access the property they had received although the number of those who are able 
to file court cases calling for their (re)instatement is much more limited.  12 
 
attempts to quantitatively assess their economic impacts at a national scale are surprisingly scant. 
One study finds that the number of identifiable land reform laws across states is positively related 
to the extent of poverty reduction but not agricultural productivity (Besley and Burgess 2000). 
While this could be used to make the case for land reform as a redistributive measure, e.g. 
through a wage effect, use of a measure only weakly linked to implementation of reforms is a 
shortcoming. Studies using data on implementation have only been conducted in individual states, 
mainly West Bengal. District level data point towards a positive impact of land reform on 
productivity (Banerjee et al. 2002), a finding that receives support from household level evidence 
taking into account other political factors (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). However, as the 
policy environment in West Bengal is likely to be uniquely conducive to land reform, a national 
assessment of land reform impact based on actual implementation would be very desirable in 
view of the continued relevance of the topic in India’s policy debate (Government of India 
2006b).  
2.3 Hypotheses on land reform impact  
Contrary to most empirical studies that have derived estimates of land reform impact 
from aggregate data at the district of state level, we use household level information collected 
from a large survey in West Bengal. We expect that, by reducing credit constraints, tenancy 
reform as implemented there will have a positive impact on long-term human capital investment. 
On the other hand, we expect the reform land to have lower productivity compared to own with 
full ownership either due to the lower quality of land (patta land) or due to the fact that tenancy 
reform land (barga land) is also sharecropped land. Finally, partly due to its relative lower 
productivity, and partly due to the market restrictions against reform land, we would expect the 
purchase and sale’s price of tenancy reform land to be lower than the own land.  
Hypothesis 1: Tenancy reform reduces tenants’ probability of being evicted and often also 
increases the share of output received by them. It will generally have a positive impact on 13 
 
investment. As it also transfers wealth, tenancy reform that benefits producers who had earlier 
been prevented from making such investments due to credit constraints will increase the level of 
land-related investment as well as an impact on investment in physical or human capital 
(Gersbach and Siemers 2005). As ceiling land is targeted toward landless and the poorest 
households, we also expect the positive impact of ceiling reform on investment in human capital.    
Hypothesis 2: As tenants will still have to pay rent, their incentive to undertake (non-contractible) 
land investment and to exert effort in cultivating it will be reduced, compared to what would be 
the case under full ownership. This will reduce the productivity of land use at any given point in 
time, thereby implying an indirect cost of this type of land reform. As ceiling land is more 
marginalized and fragmented land, we also hypothesize that ceiling land has lower productivity 
compared to land with full ownership.   
Hypothesis 3: In West Bengal, purchase and sale of tenancy land is only allowed to occur 
between the landlord and the tenant. Tenancy land is also allowed to sublease to third party 
regardless whether the tenant household is still able to cultivate the land. This together with the 
relative lower productivity effect proposed in the second hypothesis is expected to be associated 
with a lower purchase and sale’s price of tenancy land relative to the own land. 
 
3. Data and Estimation Strategy 
Data used in this study comes from a listing exercise of the entire population from more 
than 200 selected villages in 10 districts of West Bengal. Altogether, about 94,000 households are 
listed. An official list of 1978 land reform beneficiaries was used to draw the village sample in 
which the bargadars were over sampled to make sure enough beneficiaries are included. The fact 
we have the official list of all beneficiaries in each village across all the districts allow us to 
create a weight for each selected village.  Hence, the sample is representative after they are 
adjusted by the weights.  In addition to obtaining detailed information on land (both own and 14 
 
reform land), main physical assets as well as household demographic characteristics both at the 
initial period of 1978 and at present, detailed history of land change (either through inheritance or 
through market transactions), literacy and years of education attained for all the members of the 
dynasty households (i.e. for the head of 1978 household, head of the current household and all the 
children) is available. These provide a unique opportunity to analyze the issues at hand.  
3.1. Household characteristics in 1978   
One of the key arguments that land reform is expected to have positive long-term impacts 
is because we assume the poor and landless households are ones who received the reform land. 
By comparing household initial characteristics between land beneficiaries (bargadas or partadas) 
with those who were not affected by either type of the reform, we are able to assess whether the 
tenancy and ceiling reforms indeed served the redistributive role as initially intended.   The 
descriptive evidence from Table 3 tends to suggest that the beneficiaries of both types of reform 
are indeed those households who had endowed with little or no land and were relatively poorer 
and whose livelihood was more dependent upon agricultural sector.  In 1978, the average land 
endowment, inclusive of patta land, for  barga and patta beneficiary was respectively 1.92 acres 
and 1.31 acres, which was considerably lower than 2.54 acres, the average land endowment of 
those households who were not affected by the reform. While share of landless households 
between barga beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is about the same in 1978 (55%  and 57%, 
respectively), the share of landless households among the patta beneficiaries are considerably 
higher (75%), which is as expected as ceiling land is mainly to support the landless households. 
Examining the occupational structure of the beneficiaries, it can be seen that both patta 
and barga households heavily rely on agricultural sector.  While 91 percent of barga households 
and 87 percent of patta households reported that their head’s main occupation is either working 
for agricultural wage or farming, 76 percent of the households who were not affected by reform 
reported so. The limited number of indicators for welfare that were included in the survey (i.e. 
namely the condition of roof and wall) tends to suggest that reform beneficiaries were poorer than 15 
 
non-beneficiaries. For example, 83 percent of barga and 90 percent of patta beneficiaries reported 
to have bad quality roof (ie. identified as thatched, or of plastic or mud) as compared to 70 
percent of non-beneficiaries who reported so.   
Finally, land reform also benefited more households from lower castes, as indicated by 
the fact that 56 percent of barga beneficiaries and 73 percent of patta beneficiaries are from the 
most marginalized Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST) as compared to as compared to 
43 percent of households who were not affect by reform were from SC/ST. 
3.2. Household’s current characteristics   
By comparing households’ initial characteristics and the current characteristics by land 
reform status, we try to gain some descriptive insights on the impact of land reform. While we 
find descriptive evidence of positive impact on land and human capita investments, rental and 
sale’s market participation, we find there exist significant negative correlation between current 
income or productivity and reform beneficiaries.  However, since we did not have any data on 
household income and productivity in 1978, we cannot interpret the negative correlation as causal 
effect.  
Table 4 shows that the barga and patta beneficiaries currently own 1.17 acres and 1.33 
acres respectively as compared to average of 1.35 acres.  We notice that all the land declined over 
time, but the gap between reform beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries got smaller over time. In 
fact, the patta beneficiaries had as much land as the non-beneficiaries in 2006.  The data also 
seems to suggest that more landless beneficiaries become non landless over time.  Seventeen 
percent of barga beneficiaries changed their status from landless to land owner (from 55% to 38%) 
and almost all the patta beneficiaries are now land owner.
8   
The reform beneficiaries maintain to be the poor group of population. The average 
income per capita of barga and patta beneficiaries is Rs. 4640 and Rs. 4400 respectively, as 
                                                 
8 This is not surprising that patta beneficiaries are not landless because by the definition, they are land 
receivers.  16 
 
compared to Rs 5548 for those who were not affected.  However, it is impossible for us to make 
any conclusion about the income impact because we do not have the initial level of income in 
1978.  There is also evidence that the crop productivity of the barga or patta beneficiaries are 
much lower than non-beneficiary households. The average crop sale from an acre of land reported 
by barga and patta beneficiaries is Rs 6327 and Rs 3434, respectively, considerably below Rs. 
8079 for those who were not affected by the reform.  The lowest value of  patta beneficiaries may 
largely attributable to soil or plot quality being below average.  While it is difficult for us to 
evaluate the impact of land reform on productivity or income because we do not know the initial 
productivity and income in 1978, the lower productivity together with the lower income of reform 
beneficiary compared to non-reform beneficiary however might suggest that some inefficiency 
even though the reform might have some positive productivity at the early stage of the reform.   
The last 3 rows of table 4 also provide some evidence for narrowing gap between the young 
generation’s education and household head’s education. Increase in the education attainment 
amongst the barga and patta beneficiary households is slightly greater than than the overall 
average of 2.46. Barga and patta beneficiary households registered gains of 2.46 and 3.70 years 
respectively. This has narrowed the disparity in education which existed earlier as seen from the 
education attained by the household heads. The gap between education of the children currently 
in school belonging to reform beneficiary households and the average household is insignificant 
and denotes the strides made in the educational attainment. 
3.3. Estimation Strategy 
The main descriptive findings are in general consistent with the hypotheses we proposed in the 
previous section. Specifically, we found that while land reform had positive impact on 
households’ human capital investment, the productivity is lower for reform beneficiaries than 
non-beneficiaries. Whether these descriptive findings are borne out after we control as many 
factors as we could or not will rely on a more rigorous econometrics analysis. In this section, we 
specify the econometric equations to test for the three main hypotheses.  17 
 
 
3.3.1. Impact on human capital investment 
Our first analysis is to measure the impact of reform implementation at the household level on the 
human capital attainments of the individuals who obtained schooling after reform was 
implemented. This is accomplished by dividing the household members in the control and 
treatment group according to whether they obtained the education before and after the reform 
implementation. This dependent variable is the difference in averages of outcome post –treatment 
for the treatment group and pre-treatment for the control group.  Thus, the difference in the years 
of education of these two cohort groups in any household is regressed on the beneficiary status of 
the household.  The estimating equation is the following: 
∑ + + + + = ∆ ij r j i ik i D X R E ε δ φ β α  (1) 
Where  yi oi i E E E − = ∆ , and Eoi is the years of education received by the household member of 
the old cohort (current household head’s with atleast age …currently) and  yi E is the education in 
years of the young cohort (members currently in school).  ki R measures the reform participation 
by type of reform (barga dummy and/ or patta dummy) for the householdi.  r D  is the notation for 
district dummies, where r =1 to 20 districts in the sample.  ij X is the vector of  
household characteristics, also including age and gender. 
3.3.2. Productivity Equation 
 
The equation to estimate the marshallian inefficiency with the household level 
 
production data is as follows: 
 
∑ + + + + = ij r j i ik ik i D X S or R V ε δ φ η β α ) (  (2) 
 
Where  i V is the gross revenue receipt of the household from the total land area under  
 
Cultivation (including owned, rented, barga or patta), the variable  ik S is the share of the  
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reform land (distinguished by type k ) in the total land cultivated. Either Rik or Sik is included to 
measure the reform. 
3.3.3. Land Price Equation 
 
Market prices of own land and barga land is regressed on determinants of these such as plot 
quality and other characteristics, and any region specific difference in market prices by including 
a village dummy. Here, one of the characteristics is ‘ownership type’, which is captured by the 
barga dummy. The land purchase dummy indicates the nature of transaction, whether it is a sale 
or purchase.  Interaction of barga dummy and the land purchase dummy is included. The 
estimating equation for this is: 
12 345 12 **
irr
ii i i i i i r r i PA A Z R R T D t D t α ββ βββ δδ σ ε =+ + + + + + + + +   (3)   
Where Pi is the market price per acre of plot “i” reported by the household “j” in region “r” and 
year “t”,
9  i A is the total area of the land owned by the household,
irr
i A is total area which is 
irrigated, Z is the dummy for whether the partner belonged to the same village, R is the dummy 
for land being under any reforms or not, T is the dummy for land purchase,  r D  are  district 
dummies, t is a time dummy with  1, 2,... tT = , and  * r Dt  is the interaction of district and time 




4.  Empirical Results 
The econometrics results are largely consistent with our expectation and the descriptive evidence. 
We found that reform significantly increased the children’s education. After controlling the 
households characteristics, the productivity and price is significantly lower for reform 
beneficiaries.  The results also distinguish differential effect between patta and bagar reforms. 
                                                 
9 Since very few reported with sale and purchase at the same time, we can not and do not control household effects in this regression. 
Hence, subscription “j” does not explicitly appear in the equation.  
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Most of the results are consistent across different model specifications and using difference 
measure of reforms.     
4.1.  Education  
Table 5 presents the estimates to assess the long-term impact of land reform on increments in 
household members’ educational attainment, defined as the difference between the level of 
education attained by the young (who attained education after the implementation of reforms) and 
household head’s (those who attained education before the reform). We find land reform 
significantly increased the education attainment for the members of beneficiary households.  
All regressions include controls for head’s age, children’s age and district fixed effects. Column 1 
reports the coefficients for barga and patta reform participation. Without controlling for 
additional household level variables, the reform dummy has a positive and significant impact on 
education attainment of members in the household. Columns 2-4 successively include additional 
controls for assets and land area owned, and the corresponding figures in the current period. The 
coefficients are highly positive for both the barga and patta dummy in all the regressions, 
indicating that both ceiling and the tenancy reforms had positive impact on the human capital 
accumulation of beneficiary households. The fact that the magnitude for patta land (0.9-1.2) is 
much larger than that for barga (0.3-0.4) may suggest that the ownership of land is indeed more 
important.  
Table 6 includes the interaction of the beneficiary status and the landlessness dummy at the time 
of reform in 1978.  It can be seen from the positive and significant coefficient that the landless 
household which are barga beneficiaries increased the human capital accumulation by nearly 1 
year more than the rest. The impact of patta reforms on education of members was also larger for 
the landless households. In column 3, the specification controlling for land owned in 1978 and 
non-land assets (no. of buffloes) in 1978, the coefficients are smaller but positive and highly 
significant for barga beneficiaries.  On the other hand, the coefficient of barga beneficiary itself 
become insignificant, suggesting the entire gain in education is from the landless households. The 20 
 
negative coefficient of male dummy suggests that gap between male and female in general is 
narrowing.  
4.2.  Productivity Effect 
To determine whether the productivity of reform land is indeed lower than that of land with full 
ownership as suggested in the descriptive analysis, we regress total net revenue of a household 
(before rent payment) on the share of reform land cultivated.  These results of productivity of 
land use, presented in Table 7, are also consistent with expectations. Holding a variety of factors 
constant and for a wide range of specifications, the coefficient of both reform dummies (or of 
share of reform land in total land) is very significant and negative, suggesting significant 
inefficiency on both patta and barga land.   
In Column 1 we regress the gross revenue receipts on the dummies for current status as barga 
or patta beneficiary.  Since the data is not available at the plot level controls for the input intensity 
are not precise. However, controls for broad input measures at the household level are added in 
all regressions, controlling for share of irrigated area, total area cultivated and demographic 
variables as caste, head’s age, household size, non-land assets and education of the head. The 
coefficients on irrigated and total area cultivated are significant as expected, with irrigation 
having a large impact on crop productivity. Column 2 includes share of both barga and patta land 
in total cultivated area as a key regressor. The coefficients are negative and highly significant for 
both these variables, indicating that barga and patta land cultivation is inefficient. Column 3 
limits the sample to barga land cultivation (excludes patta cultivators). The coefficient of share of 
barga land in total cultivated is negative and significant as before. Column 4 limits the sample to 
the cultivators of both barga and own land, and finds share of barga in total area cultivated 
significantly reduces the revenue receipts. The magnitude of inefficiency is large, as column 4 21 
 
indicates the productivity for a bargadas household with all the barga land is 35% lower than non-
bargadas households who cultivated all his/her own land.
10  
4.3.  Price Effect  
Results from the hedonic land price differential regressions in Table 8. Based on the data, we did 
not find any patta land participated in either land purchase or land sale. This is not surprising 
because it is not allowed to sell. So only the comparison of price between own and barga land is 
relevant in the price regression.  In the first two columns, the observation includes only the sale’s 
plots.  And for the last two columns we pooled all the land plots that either participated in land 
purchase or participated in land sale. We were able to pool because the same set of variables 
(including price and the plot characteristics) was reported regardless of sale or purchase. Another 
difference in the model specification among all the columns is that while time and regional 
dummies are included for all the four columns, columns (2) and (4) also include the interaction of 
time and regional dummies. The results are consistent with expectation and robust across model 
specifications. This is consistent with land price regressions which point to market price for 
owned land being 8 to 15 percent higher than that for land reform land after all other factors 
(including plot characteristics and village dummies) are controlled for.   
5. Conclusion 
Distinct results of this study tie together to enumerate the benefits and costs of the land reforms, 
and have clear policy implications for the state governments. Literature has already established 
that reform policies were necessary at independence and, overall, had a beneficial aggregate 
impact on rural poverty levels. In this study we find land reform also had a significant positive 
impact on educational attainment of beneficiary households’ members. However, results also 
point out some negative ramifications which persist with tenancy. The land that had been 
received through land reform is still being operated under share tenancy arrangements as required 
                                                 
10 There is tradeoff between estimation efficiency and control of unobservables in each of the columns. Column 4 has the best control 
of unobservables among all the columns between only own land and bargadas are included, but it has the least number of observations.  
Column (4) is preferred because missing variables problem is more serious than loss of estimation efficiency, especially given sample 
size is still very large even in column (4). 22 
 
by tenancy laws, and could be subject to standard Marshallian inefficiency. The results from the 
productivity and price regressions further suggest that a large and very significant gain could be 
achieved if the current tenants were converted to land owners. This is the future direction which 
the West Bengal’s government is currently considering. Their assessment of administrative cost 
associated with any scheme to accomplish land transfers, by enabling tenants to buy out land 
from their landlords, would provide a clear guidance for future land policy action in West Bengal 
and other states. 23 
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Table 1: Global extent and characteristics of land reforms 
Country  Area   Beneficiary households   Area per   Implementation
   Total area   Share of arable Number  Share of rural   household  Period 
   (1000 hectares)  Land (%)  (thousands) Households (%)  (hectares)   
Africa                 
Egypt 390  15.4  438  10.0  0.89  1952–78 
Kenya   403  1.6  34  1.6  11.85  1961–70 
Zimbabwe 2,371  11.9  40  3.1  59.28  1980–87 
Asia                  
Japan 2,000  33.3  4,300  60.9  0.47  1946–49 
Korea, Rep. of  577  27.3  1,646  45.5  0.35  1948–58 
Philippines 1,092  10.8 1,511  24.2  0.72 1940–85 
Taiwan, China  235  26.9  383  62.5  0.61  1949–53 
Central America                  
El Salvador  401  27.9  95  16.8  4.22  1932–89 
Mexico 13,375  13.5  3,044  67.5  4.39  1915–76 
Nicaragua 3,186  47.1  172  56.7  18.52  1978–87 
South America                   
Bolivia 9,792  32.3  237  47.5  41.32  1953–70 
Brasil 13,100  11.3  266  5.4  49.32  1964–94 
Chile  9,517 60.1  58  12.7  164.09  1973 
Peru 8,599  28.1  375  30.8  22.93  1969–79 
Source: Deininger (2003).  
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Table 2: Shares of rural households and arable land area affected by different land reforms in Indian States 
   Tenancy legislation   Ceiling legislation 
State  Area (%)  Pop. (%)  No. of laws  Average age   Area (%)  Pop. (%) 
Andhra Pradesh  3.48  0.75 2 17.0 8.34  3.81 
Bihar   0.00  0.00 3 18.3 4.42  4.00 
Gujarat  15.00  11.20 2  15.5 1.95  0.31 
Haryana  0.51  0.01 0  0  1.26  0.26 
Himachal Pradesh  0.16  3.19 n.a. n.a.  0.06  0.05 
Karnataka  15.38  5.29 2 14.5 1.71  0.30 
Kerala  8.47  12.49 4  10.8 1.30  1.04 
Madhya Pradesh  2.15  0.61 1 24.0 2.69  0.71 
Maharashtra   27.01  10.68 1  23.0 7.74  1.08 
Orissa  0.15  1.43 3  9.0 2.24  1.28 
Punjab   1.89  0.04 1 10.0 1.50  0.25 
Rajasthan  0.00  0.16 0  0  6.63  0.75 
Tamil Nadu  3.65  3.23 5 13.6 2.47  1.24 
Uttar Pradesh  0.00  0.00 2 14.5 5.81  3.68 
West Bengal   6.41  10.80 5  8.2 14.91 19.73 
Total  5.45  5.35 2.1  13.03 4.41  2.27 
Source: Kaushik (2005) for columns 1 to 4; Besley and Burgess (2000) for columns (5) and (6)  
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Table 3: Descriptives Statistics (1978) 
   Total Barga Patta  Lose  land 
Not 
affected 




es       
household characteristics in 78        
Household  size  6.21 6.49 5.84 7.35 6.19 
Land endowment in 78 (inc'dg 
patta)  2.54 1.92 1.31 6.90 2.55 
landless in 78 (exc'dg patta land)  0.57  0.55  0.75  0.10  0.57 
SC/ST  0.45 0.56 0.73 0.17 0.43 
78 head literate  0.25  0.22  0.14  0.68  0.25 
Head's occup: Ag wage   0.36  0.30  0.54  0.04  0.36 
                        Farming  0.40  0.61  0.33  0.60  0.38 
                        Non-farm wage  0.12  0.05  0.07  0.04  0.13 
                        Self-employment  0.12  0.04  0.06  0.31  0.12 
Non-land assets in 78       
Bad roof (thatch/plastic/mud)  0.72  0.83  0.90  0.55  0.70 
Bad  wall  (mud/bamboo)  0.70 0.85 0.78 0.59 0.69 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics (current) 
   Total Barga Patta  Lose  land  Not  affected 




s       
Current household's 
characteristics       
Household  size    4.75 5.22 4.93 5.12 4.69 
Area  owned  1.35 1.17 1.33 3.56 1.30 
landless  (inc'dg  patta  land)  0.51 0.38 0.03 0.04 0.57 
Share  of  heads  literate  0.43 0.40 0.30 0.87 0.43 
Head's  occup:  Ag  wage    0.30 0.23 0.42 0.03 0.30 
                      Farming  0.29  0.57  0.34  0.47  0.26 
                      Non-farm wage  0.20  0.08  0.11  0.08  0.22 
                      Self-employment  0.22  0.12  0.13  0.41  0.23 
Current non-land assets        
Bad  roof  (thatch/plastic/mud)  0.32 0.45 0.52 0.14 0.30 
Bad  wall  (mud/bamboo)  0.55 0.72 0.71 0.36 0.53 
Income sources and crop 
productivity       
Income per capita  5467.94  4640.02  4400.40  10321.84  5544.80 
crop  productivity  (Rs./acre)  7240.65 6327.87 3434.89 5388.75 8079.20 
Difference in children and head's 
educ  2.46 2.65 3.70 -1.30 2.39 
Head's  years  of  educ.  3.19 2.81 1.73 8.40 3.27 
Children's  years  of  educ.  5.65 5.46 5.44 7.10 5.66 
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Table 5: Impact of land reform on Children’s Education 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 






















Area owned in 1978      -0.221 
(3.83)** 
 
Number of bufflos in 78      -0.108 
(5.24)** 
 
Area owned now        -0.035 
(1.68) 
Number of bufflo/cows owned now        -0.011 
(0.62) 




Observations  48871 48871 48871 48871 
R-squared  0.24 0.24 0.27 0.24 
Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Dummy for head’s age, dummy for children’s age are included 
District dummies are included  





Table 6: Impact of land reform on Children’s Education (interaction of landless and beneficiaries 
included) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 






































Area owned in 1978      -0.219 
(3.80)** 
 
Number of bufflos in 78      -0.108 
(5.31)** 
 
Area owned now         -0.034 
(1.68) 
Number of bufflo owned now        -0.009 
(0.51) 




Observations  48871 48871 48871 48871 
R-squared  0.24 0.24 0.27 0.24 
Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Dummy for head’s age, dummy for children’s age are included 
District dummies are included  
Cluster effect at village level is controlled 32 
 
 
Table 7: Productivity of Reform Land versus Own Land  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Current bargadas  -0.147 
(3.87)** 
   
current pattadas  -0.192 
(4.66)** 
   







































































Observations 40091  40091  5907  3189 
R-squared  0.48 0.48 0.34 0.37 
Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         
Cluster effect at village level is controlled 
(1) and (2) for full sample; (3) sample with barga land; (4) sample with own land and barga land 33 
 
Table 8: Land price differentials between own land and reform land 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 


























Barga land*dummy for land 
purchase (β) 


















Observations 14342  14342  22742  22742 
R-squared 0.20  0.24  0.36  0.23 
Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%;  
District dummies are included throughout;  
Districts, time dummies and their interaction terms are included in column (2) and (4);  
Cluster at village level is controlled 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 